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QUALIFIED COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE FOR NEWS
REPORTERS IN CRIMINAL CASES-State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d
749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984).
In State v. Rinaldo, I the Washington Supreme Court extended the news
reporter's qualified common law privilege to criminal cases.2 This extension
will adequately protect most confidential information held by reporters. In
some cases, however, defendants will be able to defeat the qualified priv-
ilege announced in Rinaldo. The Washington courts should then construe
article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution3 to require in
camera inspection of the information sought. The trial judge should order
disclosure only upon concluding that the defendant's interest in obtaining
the information outweighs the news reporter's interest in confidentiality.
I. BACKGROUND
Historically, news reporters were unsuccessful in their attempts to claim
a privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential information.4
Courts typically reasoned that the public's interest in the unrestricted flow of
evidence at trial outweighed any interest of reporters in maintaining the
confidentiality of their sources.5 As modem journalists began doing more
in-depth, investigative reporting, however, their dependence on con-
fidential sources increased. 6 Courts and legislatures, confronted with the
argument that forced disclosure of confidential information would inhibit
other potential sources of news and thus significantly restrain the flow of
information to the public, began to support a news reporter's privilege. 7
1. 102 Wn. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984).
2. Id. at 754, 689 P.2d at 395. The Washington court recognized a qualified common law privilege
in civil cases in Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn. 2d 148, 157, 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1982).
3. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 E2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)
(first amendment argument for reporter's privilege rejected); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75,
86 (1897) (defendant's communication to reporter not privileged); Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375, 377
(Colo. 1919) (reporter held in contempt for refusal to testify); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E.
781, 785-86 (1911) (no reporters privilege to refuse to disclose confidential source); People ex rel
Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291,199 N.E. 415,416 (1936) (court refused to create
common law reporter's privilege).
5. See, e.g., In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235,85 A. 1011, 1012 (1913) (reporters privilege detrimental
to the due administration of the law); People ex rel Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415,416 (1936) (interest in administration of justice outweighs the value of the privilege);
see also 8 J. WiOMORE, EvmENcE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 2286 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)
(confidential communication to a journalist not privileged from disclosure).
6. See Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 229, 252-53 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 FE2d 708,715 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing federal common
law privilege for journalists); State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93, 99 (1970) (qualified
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Reporters have based their claim of privilege on one of three legal
theories. 8 First, news reporters have argued that the four essential elements
of a common law evidentiary privilege 9 are present in the relationship
between reporters and their confidential sources and that the privilege
should therefore be judicially recognized. ' 0 Second, news reporters may be
protected under state statutes, called shield laws, enacted in more than half
of the states. I I Finally, the first amendment and related state constitutional
provisions have been advanced in support of the reporter's privilege. 12
Washington recognized a news reporter's qualified common law priv-
ilege in civil cases prior to the Rinaldo decision. 13 Its application depends
on a trial court finding that the reporter's interest in nondisclosure is
supported by a need to preserve confidentiality.14 The privilege can be
constitutionally-based journalist's privilege recognized). The Maryland General Assembly enacted the
first shield law in 1896, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp. 1978), but it stood alone
until 1933 when New Jersey followed. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21, 21a (West Supp. 1978).
8. A related argument, invoked only rarely, involves the fifth amendment as the justification for a
refusal to testify. Such a claim occurs when a news reporter, as a result of a confidential relationship with
a source, witnesses or acquires direct knowledge of criminal activity. See, e.g., Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79, 85 (1915).
9. As outlined by Professor Wigmore, these conditions are:
(1)The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2)This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
(3)The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
(4)The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
8J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2285.
10. Almost all such arguments have failed. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 37 (1980); Annot., 7
A.L.R.3d 591 (1966) and cases cited therein.
11. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's
Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 302-10 (1979) (thorough analysis of
state shield laws).
12. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (first amendment does not protect
news reporters from compelled testimony before grand jury); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy
Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (civil litigant must show compelling need
before news reporter's first amendment right will be infringed); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259,394 A.2d 330.
334 cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (news reporter does not have first amendment privilege to
withhold information subpoenaed by criminal defendant). The constitutional argument is discussed in
Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 OR. L.
REv. 243 (1968); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of
Information, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1969); Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's Privilege: An Update, 12
CONN. L. REv. 435 (1980); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969); Comment, The Newsperson's Privilege and the Right to
Compulsory Process-Establishing an Equilibrium, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 694 (1980); Note, The Rights
of Sources-The Critical Element in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979):
Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The ConstitutionalR-ight to-T Coifident-ial Relationship, 80 YALE
L.J. 317 (1970).
13. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn. 2d 148, 157, 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1982).
14. Id. at 156,641 P.2d at 1184; see also Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wn. 2d 638,642,658 P.2d
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defeated if the contesting party demonstrates that (1) its claim is mer-
itorious, 15 (2) the information sought is necessary or critical to the cause of
action or the defense pleaded, 16 and (3) a reasonable effort has been made to
acquire the information by other means. 17
II. THE RINALDO DECISION
In 1979 a reporter for the Everett Herald wrote six articles about cult
activities allegedly occurring at a place called Eden Farms. 18 To obtain
material for the article, he promised his sources he would keep their
identities confidential.19 Subsequently, Theodore Rinaldo, who was part
owner and operator of Eden Farms, was charged with statutory rape,
indecent liberties, assault, coercion, and intimidating a witness.20 He was
tried and convicted of some of the offenses.2 ' Later, several defense wit-
nesses contacted the county sheriff and stated that they had committed
perjury at trial because Rinaldo had threatened them. 22 Rinaldo was then
charged with perjury, intimidating witnesses, tampering with witnesses,
and statutory rape.23
Counsel for Rinaldo filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum directing
the Herald to disclose or deliver for in camera review the material it had
gathered about Rinaldo, Eden Farms, Ellogos (a nonprofit corporation
associated with Eden Farms) and thirty-eight past or current members of the
two organizations. 24 In an affidavit in support of this motion, counsel
argued that the Herald's records would contain information that could be
used to impeach the prosecution's witnesses. 25
The Herald moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the grounds
that the information was privileged and not subject to disclosure. 26 The trial
court held that although the newspaper had a qualified privilege under the
first amendment, it had to give way to Rinaldo's constitutional right to a fair
trial and the right of the public to have the truth ascertained. 27 The trial court
641, 643 (1983) (right to claim privilege arises only if interest of reporter in nondisclosure is supported
by need to preserve confidentiality).
15. 97 Wn. 2d at 155, 641 P.2d at 1183.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d 749, 750, 689 P.2d 392, 393 (1984).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 750-51, 689 P.2d at 393.
21. Id. at 750, 689 P.2d at 393.
22. Id. at 750-51, 689 P.2d at 393.
23. Id. at 751, 689 P.2d at 393.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 751, 689 P.2d at 394.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 751-52, 689 P.2d at 394.
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concluded that the material should be turned over for in camera review.28
The court of appeals reversed.29
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals vacating the discovery order. 30 In so doing it expressly extended the
qualified common law privilege, formerly recognized in civil cases, to
criminal cases. 31
III. ANALYSIS
A free press is an essential element of any representative democracy 32 In
a society where citizens are asked to make informed decisions on a
multitude of complex issues, the press must be able not only to gather and
report the news that is readily available, but also to engage in in-depth
investigations of potentially newsworthy areas. Confidential sources play
an important role in the success of such investigative reporting.33 Without
them, it is likely reporters would lose many controversial news leads and
thus be unable to maintain the flow of necessary information to the public. 34
By extending the news reporter's qualified common law privilege to crimi-
nal cases, the Washington Supreme Court has helped protect press access to
these sources of vital information. Further protection will be necessary,
however, to ensure that confidential information will not be unnecessarily
revealed.
A. Protection Under Rinaldo
In most situations, the qualified common law privilege created in civil
cases and extended to criminal cases in Rinaldo will be adequate to protect
confidential information held by a news reporter. The privilege arises when
the reporter shows a need to preserve confidentiality.35 In making this
28. Id. at 752, 689 P.2d at 394.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 755, 689 P.2d at 396.
31. Id.
32. See Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16-22 (1941); A. MEIKLEOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 26 (1960).
33. Blasi, supra note 6, at 245-46.
34. The undisclosed informant's importance was emphasized in the stories following the Watergate
investigation. "To the President's other men and women-in the White House and elsewhere-who
took risks to provide us with confidential information. Without them there would have been no
Watergate story told by the Washington Post." C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, Dedication in ALLTHE
PRESIDENT'S MEN 7 (1974); see also Blasi, supra note 6, at 245-46; Guest & Stanzler, supra note 12, at
57-61; Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REv. 829, 858
(1974).
35. State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d 749, 755, 689 P.2d 392, 396 (1984); Senear v. Daily Journal-
American, 97 Wn. 2d 148, 156, 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1982).
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determination the trial court must consider how the reporter obtained the
information and whether the source had a reasonable expectation of con-
fidentiality.36 A news reporter should be able to satisfy this threshold
requirement if there was an express or implied understanding between the
reporter and the source that the information itself or the source's identity
would remain confidential, and if the circumstances under which the
communication was made support the existence of such an understanding. 37
Upon this showing, the burden of defeating the privilege should shift to the
contesting party.38
To defeat the common law privilege, the party seeking discovery must
show three things. First, the cause of action or defense asserted must be
meritorious; i.e., not frivolous or raised for the purpose of harassing the
reporter.39 To satisfy this requirement in civil cases, the party must
"'establish jury issues on the essential elements of [his or her] case not the
subject of the contested discovery. '"'40 This burden should fall on the
defendant in a criminal proceeding only with respect to those defenses on
which the defendant has the burden of producing evidence. No useful
purpose would be served by forcing the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion to a defendant who could not, even when in possession of it, create a
jury question with regard to the defense raised. However, where the pros-
ecution bears the burden of production on a particular issue, and the
defendant can create a jury question on that issue simply by pleading not
guilty, the defense should automatically be recognized as meritorious.
Thus, this standard will not bar many criminal defendants' attempts to
defeat the privilege.
36. Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wn. 2d 638, 642,658 P.2d 641, 643 (1983); Senear, 97 Wn. 2d
at 156, 641 P.2d at 1184. It is unclear if a news reporter must show that the source continues to have a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality, see Senear, 97 Wn. 2d at 156, 641 P.2d at 1184 ("[t]he Court
• . .should look to. . . whether the source has reasonable expectation of confidentiality") (emphasis
added), or if it is sufficient to show that such an expectation existed at the time the communication was
made, see Clampitt, 98 Wn. 2d 638, 642, 658 P.2d 641, 643 ("[tlhis question . . . depends upon
whether the source hJud a reasonable expectation of confidentiality") (emphasis added). The better view
would allow the claim of privilege if the reporter establishes that the source had a reasonable expectation
of confidentiality at the time of the communication. Any other approach would usually necessitate the
testimony of the source and thereby undermine the privilege sought.
37. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597-98 (1st Cir.
1980) (court should look at source's expression of need for confidentiality); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92
Misc. 2d 410,400 N.Y.S.2d 442,447 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (privilege did not arise because news reporter had
not expressly or implicitly promised confidentiality to the source).
38. See Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wn. 2d 638, 642,658 P.2d 641,643-44 (1983) (privilege
arises upon showing of need to preserve confidentiality but may be defeated by opposing party).
39. State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d 749,755,689 P.2d 392,395 (1984); Clampitt v. Thurston County,
98 Wn. 2d 638, 642, 658 P.2d 641,644-45 (1983); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn. 2d 148,
155, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1982).
40. Clampitt, 98 Wn. 2d at 646, 658 P.2d at 646 (quoting Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 E2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980)).
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The second standard requires the party contesting a news reporter's
privilege to show that the information sought is necessary or critical to the
cause of action or the defense asserted. 4 1 Proper evaluation of a criminal
defendant's claim under this standard should focus on the effect the infor-
mation could have on the outcome of the trial. 42 Where the testimony of
prosecution witnesses is essential to the state's case, the defendant's convic-
tion depends on the fact finders' perception of their credibility. In such
cases, impeachment evidence would be "necessary or critical" to an
effective defense and the trial court should find the second standard satis-
fied.
To satisfy the third standard, the defendant must show that a reasonable
effort has been made to acquire the desired information by other means. 4 3
The interest of news reporters in maintaining the confidentiality of their
sources is so compelling that their files should be used only as a last resort.
Moreover, if the defendant can obtain the information by a less intrusive
means, the defense effort is hampered very little by the unavailability of
press documents. In evaluating the efforts made by the defense under this
standard, the trial court should consider the purpose for which the desired
evidence is intended. Where, for example, a letter written by a prosecution
witness is sought for the purpose of discovering factual information con-
tained therein, the number of possible alternative sources will be great and
the required showing therefore substantial. If, however, the same letter is to
be used to contradict the testimony offered by its author at trial, it may be so
uniquely valuable that no alternative of equal worth could be found. 44 Thus,
despite the "very substantial" obligation4 5 imposed by this standard, there
will be situations in which a criminal defendant can show that the news
reporter is the only available source.
41. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d at 755, 689 P.2d at 395; Clampitt, 98 Wn. 2d at 642, 658 P.2d at 644;
Senear, 97 Wn. 2d at 155, 641 P.2d at 1183.
42. See Comment, Sixth Amendment Limitations on the Newsperson's Privilege: A Breach in the
Shield, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 361,392 (1982). Denying the defendant access to impeachment evidence could
infringe the right of compulsory process and undermine the effective cross examination guaranteed by
the confrontation clause. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (Brennan, J., concurring),
reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 215 (1972); People v. Le
Grand, 67 A.D.2d 446,415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 257 (1979). Cf United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348,
356 (1969) (suggesting that denial of production of prior recorded statement of witness might be denial
of sixth amendment right). But see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (right of confrontation is a
trial right and does not entitle defendant to prior statements of prosecution witnesses).
43. State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wn. 2d at 755, 689 P.2d at 395-96; Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wn.
2d at 642, 644-46, 658 P.2d at 644-45; Senear v. Daily Joumal-American, 97 Wn. 2d at 155-56, 641
P.2d at 1183-84.
44. See State v. Boiardo, 83 N.J. 350, 416 A.2d 793, 799 (1980) (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
45. Clampitt, 98 Wn. 2d at 644,658 P.2d at 645 (quoting Zerilli v. Smith, 656 E2d 705,714 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)).
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B. Protection Under Article 1, Section 5
Criminal defendants who meet the three standards outlined in Rinaldo
should not be automatically entitled to confidential information held by a
news reporter. Rather, article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitu-
tion46 should be construed to require in camera review before disclosure is
ordered. Only by actually examining the materials sought can the trial court
be certain that their importance to the defendant's case warrants abrogation
of the news reporter's privilege.
After reviewing the materials held by the news reporter, the trial court
should weigh the interests of the defendant in obtaining the information
against those of the news reporter in protecting its confidentiality 47 More
weight should be given to the defendant's interests where the information
sought is of great value to the defense effort and is not available elsewhere.
The defendant's interests should also receive greater weight as the
seriousness of the potential sanction for the crime charged increases. 48
On the other side, the interest of the news reporter in maintaining
confidentiality should be given greater weight where forced disclosure
would exert a chilling effect on other potential news sources. 49 Additional
weight should also be assigned to the reporter's interests if the information
sought is of the type necessary for effective citizen participation in the
political process.50 Only if the trial court determines that the interests of the
defendant in the materials before it outweigh the interests of the news
reporter should the information be disclosed.
Susan Ward
46. Article 1, § 5 provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right."
47. Such a balancing approach has been adopted by many state courts confronted with a request for
confidential information from a news reporter. See, e.g., In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d
697 (1979); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
48. See Comment, supra note 42, at 392-93.
49. The chilling effect would be greatest in well-publicized cases where revelation of the source's
identity might subject the source to reprisal.
50. See Comment, supra note 12, at 714-15.
